

## **Dynamics of Pakhtun Social Structure: Implications for Economic Development**

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Every region and people has peculiar economic characteristics and these features largely have roots in that region's social structure, social psychology and its dynamics. The capitalist economy of the United States has roots in individualism and Protestant Work Ethic, influenced both by Protestant religion and the social character of the Americans; the Client Economy of Saudi Arabia has deep linkages to its tribal social structure and the so-called Bazaar Economy of Afghanistan is profoundly embedded in the Pakhtun social structure of the country. The Pakhtuns of Pakistan have a peculiar social structure and social psychology thereof having profound and extensive influence on the region's economy particularly its largely underdeveloped condition. The paper explores the characteristics of Pakhtun social structure and the interactive linkages between the social edifice and economic development or lack of it.

**Keywords:** Pakhtun, social structure, Pakistan, economy, development, underdevelopment

The Pakhtun ethnic group has the largest tribal setting in the world, which is profoundly structured in form (Tainter, Joseph, MacGregor, Donald; 2011). Pakhtun culture has certain peculiar elements which makes its social structure somewhat unique (Glatzer, 2002; Taj, Shah, Bilal, 2018). Pakhtun society has a few statuses as is a feature of any traditional society. Some of the main statuses include that of *malik* or *khan* (tribal leaders or elder), mullah or clergyman and *kasabgar* (artisan or menial worker). Likewise, the social roles in traditional Pakhtun society are also correspondingly a few because of the non-

complexity of the society (Qazi, 2012). The stratification of Pakhtun society is not of western-type in the sense that it is not composed of socio-economic groups. Instead, social stratification of Pakhtun society is based on tribes, sub-tribes and clans (Glatzer, 2002). The social institutions of Pakhtun society mainly comprises of extended family or clans; subsistence economy; madrassas or Muslim education institutions, Islam as a predominant religion; interpersonal communication networks or linear group communication through public address system (loud speakers). The loud speakers are installed at each and every mosque to communicate with the local people instead of through developed media systems. Whereas, certain related administrative and cultural characteristics in Pakhtun society include: the settlement of disputes and feuds through tribal councils locally called Jirga presided over by chieftains or local elders instead by law-graduate judicial officers. The decisions of Jirga are taken either according to *Rivaj* (local customs) or *Shariat* (Islamic Laws). Other cultural characteristics of Pakhtun society include collective habitation of families and clans; individual subject to and bound by the decisions of the elders of clan or tribe even regarding his or her personal life and the absence of nuclear families in the region as the basic social institution. Besides these administrative and cultural characteristics and limited social statuses and roles, the miniscule social, economic and political mobility, taking pride in adherence to the traditional practices, ossified customs or change resistant social psychology and ultraconservative idiosyncratic viewpoints and behaviours towards women, reveal Pakhtun social structure rigidity and inflexibility (Qazi, 2012).

In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, the rigidity of Pakhtun social structure is legitimized by the doctrinal construct of *Pakhtunwali*, which also provides a moral foundation and psychological justification to its social system. This construct in the shape of *Pakhtunwali* enjoins an individual to maintain his honour and shame as well as personal autonomy in society as a 'Pakhtun'. According to it, anyone who fails to comply with, is considered to have lost the spirit of 'Pakhtun-ness' (the aggrandized or elated status as 'Pakhtun'). 'Pakhtun-ness' compels Pakhtuns to the pursuit of power, status, and honour within the tribal genealogical framework. In this pursuit, hospitality becomes central to the value system, generosity to win followers and badal (revenge taking) and controlling women to defend honour (Ahmad, 1980; Lindholm, 1982). The state of Pakhtun-ness not only makes Pakhtuns to believe themselves superior to all other people but also contributes to the rigidity of Pakhtun social structure (Lindholm, 1982). Adherence to *Pakhtunwali*, in order to keep the Pakhtun-ness and aggrandizement intact, requires the utilization of the society's financial resources, time, and energies, which instead, can be effectively invested in the economic, political and social development of society.

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Hence, adherence to *Pakhtunwali* for the sake of Pakhtuns pride results in rigid social structure which has large-scale implications for overall but specifically economic development in Pakhtun society. Myrdal (1958) argues that Pakhtuns love for traditions has been insurmountable. He wrote that an inflexible or rigid society is always in equilibrium of a static nature where status quo is highly cherished and thus institutionalized and all the elements and forces of the system are focused on the prevention of change. New information is prevented from entering channels of communication and perceived as endangering its static state. Therefore, a rigid or a closed society like that of Pakhtuns requires a class system based on ascribed roles and statuses or primordial criteria such as race, religion, caste or ethnicity to function and sustain itself. In a society with inflexible character, socioeconomic and political mobility is severely restricted, as well as the economic and social development of its individual members is obstructed as a result. Such a society has a centralized political-power structure in which the distribution of power including economic power and political dispensation are protected by a traditional doctrines and ideas. Thus, the idea of what is perceived as the truth is passed on unchangingly from generation to generation over centuries. A society with inflexible and rigid social structure may have industry which might require rudimentary technical training and ordinary technology instead of high-tech or state-of-the-art technology to function. In such physical settings and dominant social psychology the flourishing and whetting of personal talents and abilities have numerous hurdles leading to the prevalence of incompetence and lack of industriousness. Incompetence in turn reinforces the class system and discourages economic development.

### **Literature Review**

Both economists and sociologists have identified a close relation between social structure and economy (Zukerman, 2003; Rauch & Alessaandra, 2001; Dutta, Jackson, 2003). In particular Granovetter has explored the relationship between social structure or for that matter sociology and economy extensively (Granovetter, 1985, 1988, 1995a, 1995b, 2002, 2005). His *Sociology of Economic Life* along with Richard Swedberg (Granovetter, Swedberg, 2001) has been a great contribution to the interrelationship between social and economic structures. However, scholarly studies on the relationship between the social structures and economic development are not numerous (Oakland, 1978) while there is skimp literature on the Pakhtun social structure and its economic implications. A sophisticated or even a developed economy could only flourish without an umbrella of a developed state structure. Pakhtuns mainly inhabit Pakistan and Afghanistan while majority live in Pakistan, where they are the second largest ethnic group. Pakhtuns constitute the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan but their number is less there than in Pakistan (Clements, 2003).

However, due to their largely tribal *modus vivendi* their sense of excessive pride in their ethnic origin and cultural values they could not completely assimilate in either multiethnic Pakistan or Afghanistan (Ahmed, 1976). Pakhtun social structure and the resultant tribal system of Pakhtuns have facilitated the local but traditional economy (Glatzer, 1992). However, Glatzer has failed to identify and explain the implications of the Pashtun tribal system for the establishment of a developed economy. Akbar S. Ahmed in his work on Pakhtun economy and society has tried to explain the internal socioeconomic dynamics of Pakhtun society (Ahmed, 1980). However, his work could not explain the relationship between Pakhtun society and economy from the standpoint that what implications the peculiar nature of Pakhtun social structure has for the economic development or under-development. Although the use of the 'tribe', 'tribalism' have become archaic and disparaging in most of the world but among Pakhtuns they are widely practiced and form the basis of their social structure (Glatzer, 2002). Nicholls (1960) explains that in an inflexible social structure and the social interactions and the social psychology it gives birth to are not innovative as sanctions are exercised against theories that challenge the traditional view of the truth. Moreover, such a society is simple or less differentiated in organization. Price (1957) in his work contended that the subsystems of a rigid society are tightly interlocked, and the pressures exerted on each by the others tend to make all throw up barriers to an outside stimulus (change) which could endanger the entire rigid system. Strikingly similar inflexible structure has been found in Pakhtun society (Barth, 1959). This society for centuries rather at least a millennium has had remained static and inflexible primarily and fundamentally because the rigidity of the social structure could not allow and facilitate the process of economic development which in turn could not transform the traditional society into a modern one. (See modernization approach for details).

### **Method**

In order to carry out the study qualitative approach was employed and within that ethnographic research design was made use of. The study was carried out in districts Swabi and Charsadda of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan that are considered as the heartland of Pakhtuns in Pakistan. As the purposive sampling technique was suited best for the collection of data for this purpose, 20 carefully selected respondents from the two districts were interviewed in depth and at length along with 02 Focused Group Discussion FGDs in each district to look for the major trends and themes regarding the features and characteristics of Pakhtun social structure and their implications for the economic processes resulting in progression or regression.

### **Economic Features of Pakhtun Region**

Like the uniqueness of their social structure the economy of Pakhtuns is also quite distinctive. The Pakhtun regions' economy, whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan, has some key characteristics which need to be explained in order to understand the implications of the social structure for the economy (Berea, 2011). Following have been the key characteristics of Pakhtun regions' economy some of which are quite unique.

### **Land: Most Sought-After Economic Asset**

The most valuable economic asset of Pakhtun tribal society is the land or real estate. It has much to do with the social psychology of the Pakhtuns. Possession of land is the determinant of the status in Pakhtun society and more often than not Pakhtun is another term for having vast land in possession. The tribes are in constant search for new land; once appropriated, the land becomes a collective good (Buchanan, 1965) that is rotated among the landowners of the tribes through the so-called *Wesh* (distribution) system. The *Wesh* system represents the rotation of the land every 10 years, as the initial land has specific different ecologies and thus some landowners might receive a higher comparative advantage. Thus, land is the most important cause for disputes, but also a source to settle conflicts and feuds (Alam, et al., 2014). The bargaining for the land ownership is a clear example of bargaining with the lowest transaction costs (Coase, 1937). As an essentially non-monetary system, the Pakhtun tribal system does not prefer considerable asset accumulation in capital but in the form of land.

### **Industry in Pakhtun Region**

The Pakhtun regions in Afghanistan and Pakistan lack industrialization on a large-scale. While there is no reliable data available for industrialization in Afghanistan which is one of the most economically backward countries of the World while on the other hand the KP province has also been economically largely underdeveloped having a mere US \$30 billion size of economy (Haider, 2020), which is just 10.5 percent of the total size of Pakistan economy that is around \$304 billion (Industrial Policy, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2016). Economically the province has been far behind the overall economic development indicators (Pakistan Development Update: Growth A Shared Responsibility, 2017). The KP is predominantly rural and small scale retail trade makes most of the province's economy instead of industry or agriculture resulting in insignificant incomes. In a nutshell industrial sector has no role in the society of the province (Industrial Policy, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 2016). There are several reasons for this lack of industrialization in Pakhtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. One theory in this regard is 'locational disadvantage.' According to this theory as both KP province, which is situated contiguous and juxtaposed to

the Pakhtun-dominated regions of Afghanistan, are located far away from seashores and seaports, therefore establishment of large-scale industries have not been profitable. However, this is somewhat unreliable theory because then why the Central Asian States (CAS) particularly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and even parts of China, which are located farther than the Pakhtun regions from the seaports have developed extensive industrial infrastructure. In Pakistan, one explanation for lack of industrialization in the KP has been the Punjab-dominated federal government structure, which not only discouraged large-scale industrialization in the KP, former FATA but also in Balochistan province, partly inhabited by Pakhtuns, so that the Punjab may not lose its competitive economic edge within Pakistan. However, the lack of industrialization in Afghanistan, a country ruled since 1747 by Pakhtun rulers and dominated by Pakhtun population is incomprehensible within the context of state policy as could be the argument in case of lack of industrialization in Pakhtun regions of Pakistan. Therefore, one has to search for non-political particularly non-ethnic factors for lack of industrialization in Pakhtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The only industry worth its name that has really thriven in the Pakhtun lands in Pakistan has been the firearms manufacturing particularly in the town of Darra Adam Khel on the road between Peshawar and Kohat. Hundreds of cottage firearms manufacturing units have been operating in Darra for more than 80 years (Mian, 2010). Since the weapons making technology was first secretly provided by Adolf Hitler ruled Germany to Pakhtun tribesmen to encourage a revolt against its arch-rival British Empire's in its greatest colonial possession in India. As Pakhtun tribesmen had very strong anti-British feelings the Germans under Hitler wanted to capitalize upon this emancipatory potential of the Pakhtuns to create problems for the British Empire in India so as to take military advantage out of the situation in Europe, where both the imperial powers were located. However, the Pakhtuns adapted the firearms manufacturing technology and went on with improving the craft even after the World War II when the Germans were decisively defeated by the Allied Powers including Great Britain and the United States. The thriving of crude weapons industry has not been due to the Pakhtun love for industry or craft but as the firearms manufactured in Darra have had a huge demand and market in the Pakhtun land. The foremost rather underlying reasons for Pakhtuns dislike for industries could be discovered in the social structure of the ethnic group. The interminable disputes and conflicts over land, honour and financial matters and the animosities and rivalries they have been producing have had made it mandatory for all the Pakhtuns to have firearms. Thus the flourishing of firearms industry in the Pakhtun mainland has also been deeply rooted in the group's social structure. Then this firearms

industry has a significant role in the society's dispute-filled environment and war economy which since the 1980s has flourished both in the Pakhtun-dominated Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Upper Balochistan, inhabited by the Pakhtuns in Pakistan.

### **War Economy in Pakhtun Lands**

A war economy has thriven in the Pakhtun mainland, whether in Pakistan or Afghanistan, after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, followed by the Afghan Civil War (1989-1996), the Taliban regime (1996-2002) and since the US-led International Security & Assistance Force (ISAF) ouster of the Taliban regime and occupation of the country ensued by the Taliban insurgency (Rubin, 2000). The impact of the international and civil war as well as insurgency in Afghanistan has been grave on Pakistani side of the border especially on the Pakhtun inhabited areas foremost in the shape of the evolution of an extensive war economy (Rubin, 2000). War economy can be described as a phenomenon in which the productive resources of a country, region or area are mainly and increasingly allocated or are geared by war, conflict and local rivalries. This war economy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan region has much to do with the Pakhtun social structure and the economic landscape that evolved over centuries thereof.

### **Absence of Capital Formation Institutions**

One of the key causes of economic underdevelopment and lack of industrialization in the Pakhtun regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan is the non-availability of much-needed capital to develop infrastructure and production units. The most effective way to raise capital for industrialization is to have a capital market or stock exchange where joint-stock companies could float their shares to the shareholders and in return have the required capital for establishment or expansion of industries. In the entire Afghanistan there has ever been a developed stock exchange due to which companies could not be formed and industries could not be established for want of capital. Likewise, in Pakhtun-dominated regions of Pakistan there has been no stock exchange while the need has been immense. In place of capital markets or stock exchanges Pakhtun regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan have been dotted with the traditional rather archaic institution of *Saraf* (the money-lender) who provides money in lieu of gold, land and other valuables mortgage. With the institution of *Saraf* has been associated two traditional and illegal methods of money transactions that are *Hundi* and *Hawala*. Pakhtun traders and workers have been making use of *Hundi* and *Hawala* to remit and transfer money from abroad particularly Arab-Gulf countries and other parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The absence of any capital market or stock exchange in the Pakhtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan has primarily been due to the Pakhtun social disbelief in the institutionalized and modern economic institutions to raise capital for manufacturing and service sectors. This in turn has had roots in the unruly and stateless nature of common Pakhtuns. Because it is the state of Pakistan or Afghanistan which could establish capital markets in the Pakhtun regions, however, the very weak association of Pakhtuns with both the states despite dominating Afghanistan as rulers and also Pakistan to some extent have had prevented their leadership to organize their Pakhtun followers to make the political-policy demand of establishing capital markets. A leadership and people steeped in ultra-conservative social structure and making all efforts to reinforce this structure instead of reforming and replacing it could not envision the value of developed economic institutions like that of a capital market.

### **Lack of Urbanization**

Afghanistan as a whole and Pakistan's Pakhtun regions are the most non-urbanized areas in the World. Although Afghanistan has had a number of cities but none including Kabul could qualify to be a truly urban centre. Same is the case with Pakhtun regions of Pakistan, where only the capital of KP province, Peshawar, could qualify to be a proper city with the inauguration of a city metro service in August 2020 and establishment of modern housing societies. Lack of urbanization in Pakhtun-inhabited regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan has largely been linked to the rural dominated landscape, a traditional agro-based economy and a social psychology where yearning for industrialization has been minimal while the institutions to raise capital non-available.

Keeping in view the postulates of the *Modernization Theory* that economic underdevelopment or economic development has roots within that society particularly its traditional norms, values, institutions and technology, the lack of urbanization, industrialization, education and democratization are linked in a concatenated chain according to this theory. Thus this theory is very much applicable to lack of economic development in the Pakhtun regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan as a whole. So we have to look for the economic underdevelopment of Pakhtun regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan within the social structure. This variable is therefore, largely responsible for economic underdevelopment of Pakhtun regions of Pakistan. If these regions have to make economic development there is a need for internal change in the traditional norms, values, institutions and technology.



### **Pakhtun Social Structure and Implications for Economic Development**

Social structure plays a critical and conditioning role in the functioning of the economy, distribution of productive resources, wealth, economic statuses and roles in a society. Like any society in Pakhtun society the relationship between social structure and economy has been intertwined. Empirically the rigidity and inflexibility of the social structure of Pakhtuns, whether in Afghanistan or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan has been a great impediment to economic growth. A closer observation and analysis reveals that it is the unsupported ultra-tribal, profoundly-conservative reactionary (if one is not culpable of using so many adjectives but explaining complex societies necessitates their use in order to fully comprehend such societies) social structure of Pakhtuns which could not provide the supportive milieu for the thriving of industries. Such a social milieu could not make the people industrious and enterprising. Moreover, pervasive and prevalent conflicts as part of social life necessitate investment in weapon-making, selling and buying. Then industries could not flourish due to the absence of the supportive social ecosystem primarily continual peace and stability. This again has been due to the conflict-ridden and conflict-dictated social dynamics of the Pakhtuns. Then sustaining conflicts and rivalries require continuous income which only such a war-economy could provide. Consequently, a large number of Pakhtuns become associated with illegal economic activities primarily opium production, heroin manufacturing, goods smuggling and gun-running. The capital from these activities has over the years been invested into legal businesses providing great support to the war-economy in turn. Considering the land most valuable asset by majority of Pakhtuns as it is the biggest source of pride, in the vainglorious and conflict-ridden society, prevented Pakhtuns to value capital. This has had extensive implications for the economic development of Pakhtuns because the society could not focus on the accumulation of wealth and its importance for industrialization. Pakhtuns disdain for wealth accumulation prevented them from economic transformation which could have changed the complexion of society from agrarian to industrialist and from rural to urban as happened after the Industrial Revolution in England and rest of Europe in 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Century or the path generally prescribed by modernist theorists in order to achieve higher level of development for every country and region.

Lack of industrialization in the Pakhtun lands has also been due to the very reason that the unsophisticated psychological feeling of freedom and the ethnic group members' proclivity to retain this freedom by any means develops a habit of disregarding rather hating legal authority of the state. Therefore, there has not been any strong policy demand(s) from the Pakhtuns in Afghanistan and

Pakistan from the state authorities to establish industries on a large scale and modernize and mechanize agriculture in their areas. In response the state could not play an instrumental role in the economic development of Pakhtun regions. Nevertheless the state of Pakistan also has had a policy to keep the Pakhtun regions economically underdeveloped as the state has been domineered by the Punjabi majority, thinking economic development of Pakhtuns as counterproductive to the economic interests of the Punjab. Moreover, the state in Pakistan also has had desisted from carrying out large-scale industrialization of the Pakhtuns thinking that the wealth thus created would make the inherently freedom-loving Pakhtuns more independent which may strengthen the centrifugal tendencies already strong among the Pakhtuns. Nevertheless, it has been the closed and traditional-dominant ossified Pakhtun social structure and the myopic leadership it has had produced which could not understand the value of transforming the social structure to make it more open to change and development. Instead the Pakhtun leadership concentrated on stirring up separatist tendencies raising the fears and alarms of Pakistani decision-makers not to economically develop the Pakhtun regions. However, the Punjab-dominated Pakistani policymakers overlooked the fact that more economically developed Pakhtun regions would get mainstreamed and would play their critical part in national development. In this whole process Pakhtun social structure could not give birth to genuine leadership and movements to ask for their genuine economic rights from the state of Pakistan.

On their part to survive economically instead of demanding from government to establish industry or to set industrial units themselves majority of Pakhtuns resorted to retail and cross border trade. In particular the smuggling across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has been a source of succor for thousands of Pakhtun families. The smuggling itself demonstrates the anti-state or stateless proclivities of Pakhtuns, which obviously have their roots in the Pakhtun social structure (Rubin, 2000).

Flexibility of a social system can be determined by the openness of the social class structure, a sine qua non of the economic development of a society. An innovative or change oriented economic system is judged by the degree of technical competence, organizational complexity, productivity and mainstreaming of women, which claims to be essential for the development of a technically superior and a self-correcting economic structure. Innovation and technical competence are primary characteristics of a flexible economy and its most direct indicators. The rigid Pakhtun social structure embedded in the self-aggrandized nature of Pakhtuns has had largely influenced the economic growth (development) in Pakhtun society. Pakhtun society may be described as partially

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atomized, reduced to the most basic element (the individual) that is, each man (but not each woman) considers himself as independent and self-sufficient. However, this atomization of Pakhtun is totally unlike western individualism, which entails a range of rights and responsibilities. Pakhtun men feel proud to present themselves as completely self--reliant (Lindholm, 1982, 1996). However, notwithstanding the cultural ideal of self--sufficiency, economic exchanges do occur in Pakhtun society. They are, however, awkward at best and often bound to fail. Because exchanges among Pakhtuns are meant to be balanced whereas in the world of business the ideal exchange occurs between equals, and must result in the exact and immediate return of what was given, or its equivalent. Most Pakhtuns, due to self-aggrandized attitudes and fear of losing pride, often do not tolerate loss in business. Even on domestic level, for example, while contracting a marriage, women members of the bridegroom's family bring cloths for the bride and their quality is kept track of so that to return exactly or with something of equal value. Failure to do so causes a loss of prestige, the preservation of which is deeply entrenched in Pakhtun social psychology. It is always difficult for majority of Pakhtuns to start a business due to the fundamental reason that one must wheedle and be obsequious to attract customers. (Lindholm, 1982) Such submissive and cajoling behaviour is totally incompatible with the aggrandized self of a Pakhtun.

Apart from business in professional occupations, Pakhtuns strive to avoid dependence on others Pakhtuns. A Pakhtun, for example, is always reluctant to accept another Pakhtun as his employer; only economic compulsions make him to unwillingly accept other's subordination. Majority Pakhtun men are unwilling to work for other Pakhtuns because of the rivalries endemic in their social system. To work for another Pakhtun is to admit one's inferior position, which negates the aggrandized self of the employed Pakhtun. For Pakhtuns, it is acceptable to work for foreigners and non-Pakhtun Pakistanis such as Punjabis because, although a Pakhtun thinks to 'demean' himself by working for them, as they are considered culturally inferior. Moreover, the researcher observed that, working for non-Pakhtun employer(s) is assuaging for the self-aggrandized self of a Pakhtun as in that case he would not be given a paighor (vituperated) by fellow Pakhtuns for groveling before his master, who is no one else but a fellow Pakhtun. That is the reason why most of the work for non-Pakhtun employers takes place outside the Pakhtun-inhabited regions and away from the Pakhtun cultural setting such employment becomes self-reconciling for a Pakhtun. This is the fundamental reason that the largest concentration of Pakhtun ethnic group anywhere in the World is in a non-Pakhtun territory that is the port city of Karachi, where of the 20.5 million population the portion of Pakhtuns is around 4.5 million. Karachi's Pakhtun population is far bigger than Peshawar, the capital

of KP province of Pakistan and Kabul, the state capital of Afghanistan.

A very few Pakhtuns develop skills so as to be competitive in the labour market, because learning skills mostly tends to be looked down upon by Pakhtuns and is against their aggrandized selves and identity. For them learning skills means to become a *kasabgar* (artisan) and *kasabgar* is perceived as a disparaging and contemptuous term and status within the Pakhtun psychological makeup. Hence, most Pakhtuns not only tend to be impractical but engross themselves in self-admiration. These personality features of a Pakhtun tend to make it difficult for him to develop the technical skills required for industry to flourish in the Pakhtun landscape. This shunning of technical skills along with tendency to avoid other Pakhtun(s) as an employer(s) have been the key reasons behind lack of industrialization in Pakhtun regions.

### **Gender Roles & Economic Development**

Gender roles and statuses are also critical to determine the role of each gender in the economic sphere and its development and underdevelopment. Women are also not part of the entire Pakhtun economic landscape because it is against the honour and aggrandized selves of Pakhtuns to let women do business and work as employees (Gohar, Basit, Ayesha, 2018). Pakhtuns' males' self-aggrandized attitudes never let them recognize the potentialities and skills of their womenfolk (Gohar, Basit, Ayesha, 2018), resulting in a negligible contribution of women in overall economic development of society. Many women in Pakhtun areas may have been allowed by their male relatives to work in homes as helpers and cleaners but most of them under financial duress. Moreover, those Pakhtu-speaking women, who work at others' homes as cleaners, make the proud Pakhtun identity as highly questionable. To this, majority Pakhtuns reply in a manner that within the traditional Pakhtun cultural values, *kasabgar* (professional workers) and peasants have never been considered as 'Pakhtuns'. This is yet again an example of self-glorification, which even does not recognize fellow Pakhtu-speaking people as non-Pakhtuns because of their low socioeconomic status. Hence, the stumpy economic development in Pakhtun society has been the logical expression of self-aggrandizement that restricts flexibility of Pakhtun social structure.

### **Conclusion and Findings**

The link between the social structure or a region, country or place and its economy is profound. The Pakhtun social structure largely having a rigid nature has had a huge role in keeping the ethnic group inhabited regions in Pakistan and Afghanistan economically extensively underdeveloped. The Pakhtun social structure very important aspect is vainglorious social attitudes of majority

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members of the society. Some key aspects of Pakhtun economy include over possessiveness regarding lands, lack of industrialization, flourishing of arms manufacturing, thriving of a war economy including gun running, goods smuggling, absence of capital markets and lack of urbanization. Pakhtuns value land more than capital and traditionally only a small segment of Pakhtun society exchange land for capital in order to invest in industries so as to accumulate wealth and raise their standard of living. All these features of Pakhtun economy have extensive and profound linkages with the Pakhtun social structure. So as a policy recommendation if the long-cherished desires of Pakhtuns and the government of Pakistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa want to overcome economic development in the province the social structure has to be engineered in such a way that a situation could be created which could support industrialization, urbanization and democratization (particularly ease of doing business) and through it economic development.

### **Recommendations**

On the basis of this research study following recommendations are put forward.

- The government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and federal government of Pakistan along with non-governmental development organizations with help from international donor organizations must take measures for extensive industrialization and growth of the services sector in the province with the aim to change the complexion of the society. So as to make people more industrious, economically engaged, positively individualistic.
- Changing the social complexion of society would require rapid but planned urbanization in the Pakhtun-inhabited mostly rural, agrarian and remote areas. Planned urbanization would help positive the cognitive, affective and behavioural changes within the population.
- In order to make Pakhtuns industrious they have to be imparted technical skills and professionalism. In this regard government and non-governmental organizations must come up with programs for each and every district and village of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.
- Making Pakhtuns responsive to and participating in skills training programs could largely be possible if they are convinced of the importance of skills. In this respect a communication strategy telling the Pakhtuns that developing skills is something associated with prophets and as Muslims this is contingent upon them to learn skills.

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